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Article 8

: Book Reviews

BOOK REVIEW

The Impact of Inflation and Devaluation on Private Legal Obligations By
Eliyahu Hirschberg Ramat Gan, Israel: Book Publishing Committee.
Bar-Ilan University. 1976. Pp. 384.
"The book is an only book of its kind in the whole modern Anglo-Saxon
legal literature," the comment made in a letter accompanying the book when
it was passed to the reviewer, defies refutation. To those who have read Mr.
Hirschberg's THE NOMINALISTIC PRINCIPLE,I the framework of inquiry will
have a familiar ring. The author is to be commended for having adopted a
more interesting style in his new book. There is still the obvious encyclopedic
knowledge as reflected in the painstakingly scholarly structure and meticulous documentation of this work.
The book is the outgrowth of research carried out over a period of many
years, and represents "a recast and enlarged version" of two studies
submitted to the University of London for which the author was awarded the
M. Phil. and PH.D. degrees respectively. It also includes materials and ideas
developed by him in some twenty-six articles which were printed in various
periodicals. To quote Mr. Hirschberg, the study is ". . .intended primarily
for those interested in Monetary Law, especially the legal aspects of contemporary monetary problems." However, due to its timeliness, the book should
prove to be of interest to practitioners, law students, economists, and
businessmen. It comes at an opportune time, a time when inflation-the
increase of the prices of goods and services and the decrease of the value of
money-has become "galloping inflation." Laymen are conscious that
money has lost some of its value-they suffer from a loss of purchasing
power-and that private parties to contracts are unable to preserve the original
value of the obligations.
On the problem of the extent of monetary obligation, the author offers three
theoretical approaches as existing in modern legal thought: (1) nominalisma pound is a pound, a dollar is a dollar, with the extent of a monetary
obligation being defined according to the sum of nominal units of currency
included within it, and the value of such units being irrelevant in the eyes of
the law; (2) metallism-a unit of account identical with a certain quantity
(weight) of standard metal, which is an expression of money as a commodity,
though no distinction may be made between unit of account and means of
payment; and (3) valorism-the value (purchasing power) included in each
I. See 7 N.C. CEN. L.J. 87 (1975).
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monetary unit, and not the nominal sum of the units of currency. Valorism is
intended to replace nominalism and metallism.
Formerly, fluctuations in the value of currency were adjusted by means of
the gold standard; however, since the abandonment, in theory and practice, of
the traditional gold standard, devaluation has become the drastic remedy
designed to achieve economic and social objectives. It is a final resort,
usually, in an effort to restore the purchasing power parity between local
currencies and world currencies-to revive the equilibrium in the balance of
payments-with exports becoming cheaper and imports becoming more
expensive. With this change in the value of money, the creditors, according to
the nominalistic principle, have to bear all the loss within the field of private
legal obligations.
The author explores at length the different kinds of value clauses-gold,
foreign currency, and cost of living-intended to protect the creditor in the
contractual relationship from changes in the value of currency. One of the
most fascinating sections of the book is Chapter 5, which treats gold value
clauses, including their creation, operation, validity, and abrogation by the
courts and by legislation in United States of America. He interprets the Joint
Resolution of the United States Congress, 2 and the decision of the Supreme
Court.'
The discussion of "Value Clauses" constitutes Part Two of the four-part
work with parts one, three, and four entitled, respectively, "The General
Solution", "Special Problems," and "Public Policy and Monetary Law."
Each part is divided into chapters and alphabetically-identified sub-chapters,
with each topic in each sub-chapter titled in a decimally-numbered section.
Under "Special Problems", the impact of monetary changes on bilateral
executory contracts is analyzed. Mr. Hirschberg introduces this section as
follows:
A clear distinction should be drawn between two groups of contracts, one group known as simple contracts, their subject matter
being only payment of money and the duty of performance lying only
on one side, and contracts known as bilateral executory contracts,
where the duty of performance has to be fulfilled by both sides in the
future. This distinction is very material to my subject matter. (p. 159)
American legal writers probably would not consider this acceptably
definitive;4 however, the author's familiarity with Israeli, English, and
2. Public Resolution No. 10 of the 73rd Congress, "Joint Resolution to insure value to the
coin and currency of the United States," approved June 5, 1933, Ch. 48 § 1, 48 Stat. 112, 113; 31
USC § 463 (1970).
3. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
4. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 6 (1932). "Contracts are classified as formal or informal;
as unilateral or bilateral."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Explanatory Note § 12, at 17. "Section 12 of the
original Restatement defined unilateral and bilateral contracts. It is deleted because of doubt as to
the utility of the distinction, often treated as fundamental, between the two types. As defined in
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German contract law compensates for such a minor blemish. Documenting
and supporting his contentions with case law, he sets forth novel concepts of
monetary problems and reform, and argues them provocatively and persuasively. Among the topics which he encompasses in chapters and subchapters
are: frustration of bilateral executory contracts caused by monetary changes;
rescission; damages in delayed payment; assessment of damages in torts;
equitable reliefs and changes in the value of money; and public policy and
monetary law. The author indicates methods of compensation in each
instance, and formulates hypothetical cases which are generally illuminating.
At times, however, the reviewer is confused by certain categorizations and
explanations, of which the following is an example:
Inadequacy of consideration, when it is closely connected with
other inequitable conduct like concealment, innocent misrepresentations, unreasonable advantage on the part of the one who takes
advantage, ignorance, financial want, ignorance of commercial dealings, inequality of standing of the two parties and their aptitude for
negotiation,
justifies the refusal of the grant of specific performance.
5
(p. 318)

At other times, the language is perplexing; the passage below exemplifies

such expression:
Being variable, public policy is treated as different from other rules of
law. It does not look to the judicial precedents but to the opinion of
what is the common good of the public.
Public policy is necessarily disabling and negative. The judges are
allowed only in certain instances to declare a contract or a condition to
be void. They are not allowed to proclaim positively what is for the
public good. (p. 342)6
Criticisms of the book have an inessentiality when the work is considered in
totality. It evidences exhaustive scholarship and exactitude in detail. Most
the original RESTATEMENT, 'unilateral contract' included three quite different types of transactions (1)the promise which does not contemplate a bargain, such as the promise under seal to
make a gift, (2) certain option contracts, such as the option under seal. . . and (3) the bargain
completed on one side, such as the loan which is to be repaid. This grouping of unlike transactions
was productive of confusion."
5. According to American jurisprudence, "innocent misrepresentation," "ignorance,"
"financial want," and "ignorance of commercial dealing," would not be placed in the category of
"inequitable conduct" with "concealment" and "unreasonable advantage on the part of the one
who takes advantage."
6. 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 64 (1965). "Courts are not concerned with purely ethical
principles, and are generally not arbiters of public policy, but a court may be called upon to
determine what the public policy is, as, for example, where it has to determine whether a contract
is or is not invalid because it is or is not against good morals, or where it has to determine whether
a foreign law that would otherwise be inapplicable in the particular case should be denied
application because it is contrary to the public policy of the forum state.
Notwithstanding the general principle that it is not the function of courts to make law, certain
courts have the power to issue rules that have the same effect as statutory rules. And where there
is no statutory authority or binding judicial precedent on a question of law with regard to which
there is a conflict among other authorities, a court is free to adopt the rule it considers
preferable."
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comprehensive are the tracing of doctrinal history and variant historical
development of legal principles, and the comparison of legal monetary
systems of the United States, Israel, Germany, England and other European
nations. The extensive bibliography alone makes it worthwhile for the
average law student.
In summary, the author recommends qualified valorism as a solution to
monetary ills accompanying devaluation. Parties should be compensated for
loss of value as measured by the cost of living index. While the exact point of
application of the valoristic solution should be determined by the legislature,
judicial adoption and the opinion of the professional community may be
necessary and helpful. If Mr. Hirschberg's conception of the equitable
fulfillment of private legal obligations can be realized, professionals and
laymen alike will bless his name.
MILDRED BRIGHT PAYTON
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Unequal Justice By Jerold S. Auerbach. Oxford University Press, 1976. Pp.
395.
Jerold S. Auerbach's Unequal Justice traces the history of the legal
profession in America from the Civil War to the present day, examining the
role of lawyers in a century of substantial social change. Auerbach found that
a significant segment of the profession, a corporate law elite, ignored basic
problems of social justice. As a consequence, people gradually lost respect
and confidence in the profession as a whole. The history concluded that
restoration of faith in legal authority "depended upon the unlikely prospect
that the legal profession would [develop] a broader and deeper definition of
social responsibility than the bar had ever tolerated."I
Traditionally, the legal profession had been "a cottage industry of single
practitioners;" in the last decades of the nineteenth century, however,
corporate law firms were organized to serve the needs of corporate capital in
the modern industrial age. In a speech at Harvard in 1905, Louis D. Brandeis
commented on this development:
Instead of holding a position of independence, between the wealthy
and the people, prepared to curb the excesses of either, able lawyers
have, to a great extent, allowed themselves to become adjuncts of
great corporations and have neglected their obligation to use their
powers for the protection of the people. We hear much of the
"corporation lawyer", and far too little of the "people's lawyer." 2
Woodrow Wilson delivered the same message to the American Bar Association in 1910:
Lawyers . . . have been sucked into the maelstrom of the new
business system of the country . . . .They do not practice law. They
do not handle the general miscellaneous interests of society. They are
not general counsellors of right and obligation.
. . .The country
3
• . .distrusts every 'corporation lawyer'.
UnequalJustice follows the legal profession through each era of American
history, reviewing the role of corporate lawyers as well as the representation
of competing demands for the public interest. The Depression of the 1930's,
for example, provided this country with an opportunity to re-examine the
powers and obligations of corporate capitalism. The best and brightest of the
bar flocked to Washington for a career in "the responsible, craftsmanlike
handling of the power of the state' ' Government service enabled lawyers to
represent the new corporate power-the federal government-and to mediate
* Assistant Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Education, North Carolina Central
University School of Law. B.A. 1962, Yale University; J.D. 1966, University of Chicago; LL.M.
1976, Duke University.
I. J. Auerbach, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 306 (1976).

2. Id. at 34-35 (see n. 55 at 313).

3. Id.at 34 (see n. 54 at 313).
4. Id.at 170 (see n. 18 at 339).
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between public good and private interest. Auerbach concluded that the
profession turned the New Deal into "a lawyer's deal": "in service to power,
lawyers made government by a legal elite the culmination of New Deal
liberalism." 5
Unequal Justicealso chronicles the development of alternatives within the
profession. Legal Aid, for example, originated in the late nineteenth century
and expanded after the publication of Reginald Heber Smith's Justiceand the
Poorin 1919. Legal Aid began to function more effectively when the War on
Poverty infused the program with federal financial support, but remains at
present a form of practice with limited funding and scope. Blacks, long
excluded from many law schools (and the American Bar Association), began
to find educational and professional opportunities in the 1930's, when
Charles Houston, Jr., and others, upgraded Howard Law School and planned
the NAACP's attack on racial discrimination. Present-day efforts to encourage entry of blacks, minorities and women into law schools and into all
segments of the profession are, however, still in the early stages and already
under attack as "reverse discrimination."
UnequalJustice demonstrates that a significant part of the legal profession
chose to serve the particular needs of corporate capitalism. This service
contributed to America's economic strength, but promoted neglect of all other
societal values. This history shows that work remains to be done. If we are to
correct the mistakes of the past, we must learn to encourage developments
within law and society so that the legal profession will be able to respond to
the full range of social concerns. We have at present an equivocal mandate in
the Legal Services Corporation Act, problematic funding for public interest
law practice, and a cynical realism about public service and public good. We
need suggestions, guidance, participation and support, if we wish some future
historian to be able to tell the tale of the generation that established equal
justice under law.
JAMES A. LEWIS*
5.

Id. at 230.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol8/iss1/8

6

: Book Reviews

Criminal Justice in America: A CriticalUnderstanding.Edited by Richard
Quinney. Little, Brown and Company, 1974. Pp. 448.
This collection of essays/readings by various authors is an extensive,
probing critique of the American system. It proposes to examine the American way of life, from an economic, historical, social and political perspective,
by using Marxism as the underlying methodology. This assemblage of
readings is designed to jar and cause one to examine basic assumptions that
many people have concerning the criminal justice system in America.
The book format is seven chapters. The introductory chapter seeks to
develop a new level of critical consciousness/awareness, and outlines the
framework for development of a critical understanding of criminal justice in
America. The next five chapters examine the fabric of the American system as
revealed in its legal order, the development of criminal law in America, law
enforcement, the administration of criminal justice and the penal system. The
final chapter considers prospects for the future-ending with an eerie choice
between computerized facism or humanistic socialism.
In the preface, the editor, Richard Quinney, states that his purpose is to
critically examine the larger context within which criminal justice operates in
the United States. His objective is to provide the understanding necessary for
the creation of an authentic human existence.
In Quinney's opinion, Karl Marx proposed the strongest alternative tothe
juridical concept of justice. Since the state and its legal order are an
expression of the prevailing mode of production, and given that capitalist
production is destructive of a human existence, the legal system supporting
this kind of social and economic order is not capable of promoting justice. To
accept the more traditional legal point of view is to adopt a mystified
conception of reality. Thus, a critical understanding of social reality requires
a frame of reference that goes beyond the notion of justice.
The editor's goal is the demystification of crime and justice in America. He
exhorts that the false reality by which we live, the one that serves the
established system, must be understood. He summarizes the underlying
concepts of the critical theory of criminal law:
I. American society is based on an advanced capitalist economy.
2. The state is organized to serve the interests of the dominant
economic class, the capitalist ruling class.
3. Criminal law is an instrument of the state and ruling class to
maintain and perpetuate the existing social and economic order.
4. Crime control in capitalist society is accomplished through a
variety of institutions and agencies established and administered
by a government elite, representing ruling class interests, for the
purpose of establishing domestic order.
5. The contradictions of advanced capitalism-the disjunction between existence and essence-require that the subordinate classes
Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 1976
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remain oppressed by whatever means necessary, especially
through the coercion and violence of the legal system.
6. Only with the collapse of the capitalist society and the creation of
a new society, based on socialist principles, will there be a
solution to the crime problem.'
In setting out a broad outline of "A Critical Theory of Criminal Law" ,2
Quinney proposes that an understanding of crime is necessarily based on
assumptions about the meaning of human existence. Even our initial conception of crime depends on how we regard the nature of our being. He asserts
that no understanding of crime can proceed without a recognition of the
existing order and how it relates to a higher ideal. All explanations of crime
are both moral and political.
The editor provides highlights of the various schools of thought in
criminology, from the dichotomy of the Classical and Positivistic Schools
through legalist criminology and the sociology of criminal law. It has been
observed that there exists a dual problem of explanation in criminology:
Crime always involves both human behavior (acts) and the judgment or
definitions (laws, customs, mores) of fellow human beings as to whether
specific behavior is appropriate and permissible, or is improper and forbidden. There is danger in the sole reliance on the state's definition of crime
because it can lead to the acceptance of the existing order.
Quinney observes that most criminology research is dominated by the
Positivistic mode of thought, and therefore takes for granted the necessary
existence of the legal system. Little attention is devoted to questions about
why law exists, whether law is indeed necessary, or what a just system is like.
Criminology, including the theories and practices of what is to be done about
crime, continues to be dominated by a single purpose: preservation of the
existing order.
The prevailing schools of thought are contrasted with a radically critical
theory of criminal law. Its operation is one of demystification, the removal of
the myths-the false consciousness--created by the "official" reality. Then,
the true meaning of current reality is thereby understood. Quinney contends
that without critical thought, we are bound to the only form of social life we
know-that which currently exists. Our current cultural and social arrangements, supported as they are by a bureaucratic-technological system of
production and distribution, are a threat to the fulfillment of human possibilities-including the freedom to know that this system is oppressive and
may be altered.
In the development of a critical understanding of criminal law, the state is
viewed as a creation of the class of society that has the power to impose its will
on the rest of society; it is a political organization created out of force and
coercion. The state is established by those who desire to protect their material
1. p.24.

2. Ch. 1, p.1.
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basis and have the power (because of material means) to maintain it. The law
in capitalist society gives political recognition to powerful social and
economic interests. The legal system provides the mechanism for forceful and
violent control of the rest of the population. The state and its accompanying
legal system reflect and serve the needs of the ruling class.
It is submitted that the military abroad and law enforcement at home are
two sides of the same phenomenon-the preservation of the interests of the
ruling class. We are told that to understand crime radically is to understand the
making and workings of the American empire. The primary interest of the
ruling class is to preserve the existing capitalist order in order to protect its
existential and material base. Any threats to the established order can be dealt
with by invoking the final weapon of the ruling class, its legal system.
Continuing the demystification, it is asserted that threats to American
economic security abroad are dealt with militarily; our armed forces are ready
to attack any foe that attempts (as in revolution) to upset the foreign markets of
American capitalism. [e.g. Cuba, Chile, Vietnam, Angola]. American
imperialism fosters and perpetuates the colonial status of foreign countries,
securing American hegemony throughout as much of the world as possible.
Such has been the history of American foreign relations. Similarly, the ruling
class uses the criminal law at home to maintain domestic order; it secures its
interests by preventing any challenge to its moral and economic structure.
The beginning of a critical understanding of law in capitalist society is the
awareness that the legal system does not serve society as a whole, but serves
the interests of the ruling class. The ruling class, however, is not in direct
control of the legal system, but must operate through the mechanisms of the
state. Viewed historically, the capitalist state is the natural product of a
society divided by economic classes. Only with the emergence of a division of
labor based on the exploitation of one class by another, and with the breakup
of communal society, was there a need for the state. The new ruling class
created the state as a means for coercing the rest of the population into
economic and political submission.
In a discussion of "The Legal Order," 3 the demystification process
continues as Quinney states that an unquestioning belief in the state prevents
an analysis that would allow us to view the state, as Marx did, as the coercive
instrument of the economically dominant class. Stanley Diamond in "The
Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom" observes that law, thus, is
symptomatic of the emergence of the state. In Diamond's opinion, Engles
epitomizes the West's awareness of itself:
The state, then is by no means a power forced on society at a certain
stage of evolution. It is the confession that this society has become
hopelessly divided against itself, has estranged itself in irreconcilable
contradictions which it is powerless to banish. In order that classes
3. Ch. 2, p. 26.
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with conflicting economic interests may not annihilate themselves
and society in a useless struggle, a power becomes necessary that
stands apparently above society and has the function of keeping down
the conflicts and maintaining 'order'. 4
Alan Wolfe, in "Political Repression and the Liberal Democratic State",
indicates that a full understanding of political repression would be obtained if
a comprehensive theory of the state existed, because repression is a form of
rule, a method of preserving capitalism. Wolfe has developed several
propositions, concerning a capitalist system, in which he proposes that
repression is one of a number of reproductive mechanisms which capitalism
requires in order to maintain itself as a system. Repression is the physical use
of force or the threat of force by those in power to meet challenges to their
legitimacy.
An inquiry into "Criminal Law in America ' 5 discloses that criminal law
emerged simultaneously with the creation of the political state. In early
societies, custom prevailed and injuries to wronged persons were handled by
the family and the community. The concept of criminal law developed only
when the custom of private or community redress of wrong was replaced by
the principle that the state is injured when one of its subjects is harmed. Thus
the right of the community to deal with wrongdoing was taken over by the
state as the "representative" of the people. As such, the state could now
employ criminal sanctions to protect its own interests and those of the
dominant ruling (economic) class. Criminal law, therefore, could develop
only with the achievement of political domination by the state-allowing law
to be established and administered in the name of a centralized governmental
authority.
During the last decade, the control of crime has entered a new stage. The
rapid increase in criminal legislation, law enforcement programs, and judicial
activity marks the attempt by the government and the ruling class to respond
to the crisis in the capitalist system. Instead of responding by changing the
social and economic system to relieve or eliminate the oppressive conditions
of advanced capitalism, the state has reacted by protecting the existing order.
Only with an examination of the American social and economic system can
we understand the meaning of criminal law, including the recent crime
control programs. The conclusion is that crime control serves the existing
order, the economically dominant class and the state. And as long as that
order is oppressive, criminal law will be used to further the oppression.
In an examination of "Law Enforcement," 6 it is observed that the
substantive criminal law is but one aspect of the legal order. The state, in
addition, creates a complex of bureaucracies to enforce and administer the
law. Their agencies protect and secure the interests of the state and its ruling
4. See, Fredrick Engels,
(1942).
5. Ch. 3, p. 93.
6. Ch. 4, p. 147.

THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE
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class. Law enforcement agencies, including local police departments, are
coercive bureaucracies that serve the state and its material interests. The role
of the police in the capitalist society has always been to preserve the existing
order. In fact, the rise of police institutions in the nineteenth century was a
response by the propertied classes to attacks made on domestic order. This
institution relieved the propertied classes themselves of the need to coerce and
control the population and provided a domestic force (other than the military)
for the purpose of maintaining domestic order.
Jeff Gerth, in the "Americanization of 1984", concludes that American
society is well on the way to becoming a police state. The enactment of this
police state-less conspicuous, yet far more threatening, than one dominated
by the military-is a scientific enterprise. Its low-profiled selective repression is based on surveillance, fear, intimidation, and information control,
rather than on the massive deployment of police. More insidious and
pervasive than the older form of law enforcement, the new crime control
system seeks to provide the ultimate means of preserving the existing social
and economic order. Through LEAA and the FBI's new version of SEARCH,
a prototype intelligence system, the legal and technological groundwork has
been furtively laid. But the creators of Big American Brother-an apparatus
designed to keep track of people's thought and actions-have carefully
avoided a military image. For his brain, they have chosen the "Criminal
Justice Information Center", rather than the more ominous-sounding,
"National Data Bank."
In an investigation of "The Administration of Criminal Law,"' it is noted
that if the legal order itself is not just, no amount of just administration can
correct its basic injustice. Robert Lefcourt writes in "Law Against the
People" that the legal system is bankrupt, beyond technical solutions and
reform. The legal superstructure is neither designed to dispense justice to a
whole community nor to allow change in property relations. It legitimizes the
power of the few and punishes those who have been defeated by or challenge
this power. His view of the future indicates that as the establishment uses its
law to cut off resistance, people will begin to see legal relationships as they
actually are, coexisting with the economic and political system. Lefcourt
visualizes that law will be demystified. People will no longer accept the
pluralist mask behind which the law pretends to be an impartial voice among
conflicting groups or individuals. People will no longer tolerate a system in
which large corporations, wealthy individuals, and property owners receive
the greatest benefits.
Haywood Burns points out in "Racism and American Law" that law is not
only discriminatory, but it also perpetuates the racism in American society.
The law has been used against minorities "to make sure that these inferior
beings stayed in their place-whatever that might be at the moment.' '8 Laws
7. Ch. 5, p. 227.
8. p. 233.
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have thus excluded Indians, Orientals, and Blacks from their lands, trom
participation in the political process, and from basic human rights. Racism in
the law is institutionalized as a product of caste and class subordination in
capitalist society. Burns observes that law cannot transcend racism but can
only confirm it, as long as the social order is racist and class-determined.
In the final chapter, "Prospects",9 it is suggested that the contradiction
within modern capitalism is that a system which violates human essence leads
to resistance and rebellion by the people. And the more the people attempt to
remove the oppression, the more the capitalist state brings repressive measures to bear on them. It is noted that reform is the capitalist state's way of
adjusting the system so that it will survive according to its own terms. An
alternative to current reality and a future of "friendly" fascism is liberation of
the capitalist state and achievement of our authentic being in a socialist
society. It is urged that we be the advocates of direct popular democracy---of
the reconstruction of society from below, of popular power over all institutions which will meet human needs, not to serve the interests of profit and
domination.
JANET OCTAVIA KNIGHT

9. Ch. 6, p. 390.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol8/iss1/8

12

